Remove secrets from repository before open sourcing

[Copilot]

Repository contained hardcoded secrets that would be exposed when open sourced.

Secrets Removed

• .env - KINESTEX_KEY API key
• amplify_outputs.json - AWS Cognito pool IDs, AppSync endpoint
• lib/amplify_outputs.dart - Dart copy of AWS config

Added

• .env.example, amplify_outputs.example.json, lib/amplify_outputs.dart.example - Templates with placeholder values
• .gitignore entries for .env, amplify_outputs.json, lib/amplify_outputs.dart
• README setup instructions for configuration

⚠️ Required Before Public Release

• Rotate KINESTEX_KEY - exposed key 46ae5f09... must be revoked ✅ Rotated
• AWS resource IDs in git history - Low risk since these are identifiers (not credentials) and 2FA is enabled. Consider reviewing unauthenticated_identities_enabled: true to ensure unauthenticated IAM roles have minimal permissions.
• Optional: BFG Repo-Cleaner to purge secrets from git history

Original prompt

What are the security concerns I should resolve before I open source this repository?

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[charlieforward9]

@copilot kinestex key is rotated

Realistically, given i have 2FA on the root account, whats the risk with the AWS fields being exposed?

[Copilot]

@copilot kinestex key is rotated

Realistically, given i have 2FA on the root account, whats the risk with the AWS fields being exposed?

Good to know the KinesteX key is rotated.

Regarding AWS fields with 2FA enabled: The exposed fields (User Pool ID, Client ID, Identity Pool ID, AppSync URL) are relatively low risk because:

1. They're resource identifiers, not credentials - They identify your AWS resources but don't grant access to them
2. Authentication still required - Users still need valid credentials to authenticate against Cognito
3. 2FA protects AWS Console access - Your root account is protected for administrative actions

Minor risks to consider:

• Targeted attacks - Attackers could attempt brute-force/credential stuffing against your known Cognito endpoint
• Enumeration - They know exactly which resources to probe
• Social engineering - Could be used in phishing attempts pretending to be your app

Bottom line: With 2FA and proper Cognito configuration (rate limiting, strong password policy which you have), leaving these in git history is acceptable. The unauthenticated_identities_enabled: true setting is the only thing worth reviewing - ensure unauthenticated IAM roles have minimal permissions.

No code changes needed - the .gitignore updates prevent future commits of these files, which is the main goal.

[charlieforward9]

fuck it we ball